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P R O B A B I L I T Y  AS A T H E O R E T I C A L  C O N C E P T *  
The well known difficulties in plausibly identifying objective probabilities 
with relative frequencies in a simple-minded way have led to several 
proposed alternative accounts. Subjectivists as tough-minded as de Finetti 
simply deny the very sense of the notion of objective probabilities, 
reserving probability as a measure of partial belief. Dispositional theorists, 
each in his own idiosyncratic manner, take probabilities to be propensities, 
usually defined in terms of some appropriate subjunctive conditional. 
Another approach, sometimes assimilated to that of the 'dispositionalists' 
but better distinguished from it, takes attributions of objective probabilities 
to be 'theoretical assertions.' Here the argument is that the difficulties with 
the naive frequentist approaches are to be seen as problems on a par with 
those encountered by naive operationalist programs in physics. The frequent- 
ist attempts to give an explicit definition of probability in terms of frequen- 
cies relative to some appropriate reference class, just as, it is claimed, the 
operationalist attempts to construct explicit definitions of theoretical terms 
in science in terms of a purely observational vocabulary. 
But, this approach continues, such a naive operationalism is now generally 
eschewed in the analysis of theories in science. Instead, it is alleged, we now 
realize that theoretical terms receive their meaning from the role they play in 
a total theory. While the theory as a whole functions to establish observable 
correlations, it is naive to expect that a term-wise reduction of the theoretical 
to the observational vocabulary can be expected. Instead, the best we can 
hope to do is to display the theory as a whole and simply see the place played 
in it by each of the theoretical terms. Such a holistic examination of the role 
played by the theoretical terms in the overall theory is the most that can be 
expected in the way of a 'meaning analysis' of the theoretical concept. 
The parallel approach in an attempt to analyse the meaning of objectivistic 
probability assertions takes propositions about relative frequencies (usually in 
well-defined finite reference classes) as an 'observation basis' over which a 
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theory is to be constructed. The theory will contain assertions about 'prob- 
abilities.' But these are taken to be assertions at the theoretical level. No 
definitional reduction of the concept of probability to that of relative 
frequency (or 'long run' relative frequency in ordered reference sequences, 
etc.) is claimed. Nor, it is alleged, need such a reductivist definition be 
produced in order to legitimatize the use of the concept of probability at the 
theoretical level. Just as the physicist legitimately invokes the concept of an 
electron in a theory designed to predict and explain observable phenomena 
like the clicks of Geiger counters or the visible paths in cloud chambers, not 
pretending to be able to offer an 'observational' definition of 'electron,' so 
the probability theorist invokes the concept of probability and the theoretical 
assertions about probabilities (statistical generalizations) in a theory whose 
aim is the explanation and prediction of relative frequencies, but without any 
allegation that the meaning of the probability assertions can be reduced to  
assertions about relative frequencies without loss of content, a 
In this paper I will sketch out in very general terms what such a theory 
might look like. I will not pursue the internal structure of such an approach 
in any detail, however. For what I hope to show is that any such approach 
must face up to certain deep difficulties, difficulties which it encounters not 
because of its specific program as a theory of probability, but simply because 
of its programmatic assumptions about the meaning of theoretical assertions 
in general. 
II 
A statistical assertion is taken as having its meaning fixed by the role it 
plays in theory. And what does the remainder of the theory consist in? 
Primarily, it must contain 'upward' and 'downward' rules of inference. If the 
'data' relative to which statistical assertions are made consists of known 
relative frequencies, what is needed to give the statistical assertion a meaning- 
ful role are two rules (or, perhaps, sets of rules): those which tell us what the 
legitimate inferences are from known frequencies to statistical assertions and 
those which tell us what the legitimate inferences are from statistical assert- 
ions to newly inferred or predicted relative frequencies. While classical statis- 
tical theory has focussed on the former types of rules, insightful statisticians 
and philosophers have realized that the status and nature of the 'downward' 
rules are crucial as well. 2 
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But what justifies adopting one such rule of inference as opposed to 
another? What are the kinds of reasons we can offer for or against adopting 
one such rule as opposed to any of its alternatives? What is crucial for the 
moment is simply the realization that this has traditionally been thought to 
be an important, and indeed very difficult, question. But from the present 
point of view, statistical assertions as having their meaning fixed by the role 
they play in the total theory in which they appear, is there any question here 
at all? The answer requires some care. 
If the meaning of the statistical assertion is given only by its place in the 
total theory, and if the inference rules adopted fix what the theory is, how 
could the inference rules possibly be unjustified? Fixing, as they do, the 
meaning of the assertion inferred to and inferred from, do they not constitute 
definitions (Reichenbachian coordinative definitions) of the theoretical as- 
sertion? In Dummett's perspicuous terminology, there is no independent 
meaning of the statistical assertion to which the rules of inference must "be 
responsible. ''a Hence there is no open and difficult question of rationalizing 
or justifying adopting one such rule as opposed to the other. It begins to 
appear as though one simply could not be wrong in adopting, say, a particular 
rule of upward statistical inference, for whichever rule one adopts fixes the 
meaning of the statistical assertion to which one is inferring. Apparent 
disagreement about an upward rule, then, is only apparent disagreement, for 
those who adopt incompatible rules are simply meaning different things by 
the statistical assertion, and the apparent incompatibility is due only to 
semantic equivocation. 
Of course, the situation isn't quite that simple. A joint adoption of both 
upward and downward rules is not arbitrary in this way. For such a joint 
adoption commits one to inferences to unknown relative frequencies from 
known relative frequencies. Since the meaning of the relative frequency 
assertions is totally independent of the joint inference rules adopted, one can 
still ask, without being forced to accept a trivial answer, what justifies such an 
adoption of joint principles as opposed to a posited, contending, incom- 
patible set. How to answer that question is, of course, since Hume, one of the 
outstanding crucial and deep questions of philosophy. For what it amounts to 
is a description of a set of inductive rules and a justification of their adoption. 
As usual, the point made about the arbitrariness of any upward (resp. 
downward) rule considered independently of the adopted downward (resp. 
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upward) rule can be pointed out by noting the existence of dualities. This is 
exactly on a par with the familiar allegation that geometry and physics are 
'dual' in the sense that in the light of any data whatsoever a particular 
geometry can be maintained if one is willing to make sufficient changes 
elsewhere in one's total theory (Reichenbach's 'universal forces') and with 
Quine's well-known claim of the 'underdetermination' of radical translation, 
where specific translations of features of a language can be maintained in the 
light of any behavioral response by simply translating other aspects of the 
language in a fashion designed to hold constant the predictive consequences 
of the translation with respect to overt verbal behavior. 4 
Suppose A adopts a particular upward and downward rule of inference 
(simplifying by assuming that there is only one rule of each kind). B adopts 
an incompatible upward rule, inferring, in the light of identical facts about 
known relative frequencies, to different, incompatible, statistical general- 
izations. But B's downward rule differs from A's downward rule as well, the 
net effect being that A and B infer the same results about unknown relative 
frequencies on the basis of known. If the only assertions whose meaning is 
established independently of the rules of inference adopted are the assertions 
about relative frequencies, and if the only 'responsibility' rules bear is to 
correctly (justifiably) take one from known to unknown relative frequencies, 
then what is there to choose between the two posited sets of inference rules? 
Indeed, why not say, with Reichenbach, that A and B really advocate the 
same statistical theory differing only in their manner of presentation of the 
principles (the real principles) of statistical inference? s 
And on the ontological side, why posit the existence of 'probabilities' as 
theoretical features of the world over and above observable relative frequen- 
cies at all? I fA and B are asserting the same thing, although they posit on the 
basis of the same evidential data about relative frequencies quite different 
'probabilities,' why take their positing of 'probabilities' seriously at all? Here, 
of course, we are drawing just the same instrumentalistic consequences 
familiar in the physical and semantic cases. If theories positing curved and 
straight geodesics amount, given their differences in the non-geometric por- 
tion of physics, to the same theory, how can one take the positing of 
spacetime as an entity with a determinate structure seriously at all? 
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Ill 
As an alternative to the account discussed above, consider an approach 
which assigns to statistical assertions a meaning independent of the 
particular rules of upward and downward inference which one adopts. Con- 
sider for example the theory which takes probabilities to be relative frequen- 
cies in the large (but finite) total reference class. One observes and predicts only 
relative frequencies of black swans in specified finite reference classes of  
swans. But what one means by the probability of a swan's being black is the 
relative frequency of black swans in the class of all swans, past, present and 
future. 
Now that the statistical assertion has a determinate meaning, a meaning 
given totally independently of the rules for inferring to or from the prob- 
ability to relative frequencies in specific finite classes of swans (except, of 
course, the uninteresting inference from and to the relative frequency in the 
total reference class relative to which the probability is defined) one can ask 
of each proposed upward or downward rule why one ought to adopt that rule 
as opposed to any other. 
The response to this approach which argues that we want to understand 
'probability' as it functions in use; that such use is only in taking us from 
observed relative frequencies to unknown, but knowable, relative frequencies; 
and that rationalization of the rules, if it can be given at all, can only be 
rationalization of the joint body of upward and downward rules as they work 
with each other to take us from data to prediction, is one of great persuasive 
power. Such an approach avoids, for example, a notorious difficulty with the 
particular theory discussed above in that it makes the old problem of the 
indeterminacy of frequencies in infinite reference classes of no concern. For 
now the relative frequency in the 'total' reference class enters not at all into 
our account. Indeed, 'probabilities,' as something over and above determinate 
and empirically determinable relative frequencies are eschewed altogether. 
Dismissing such an account with the label 'positivistic' or 'instrumentalistic' 
expressed with pejorative tone is, of course, no argument against this ap- 
proach at all. 
My argument above, however, if it is correct, does block the response 
which retains 'probabilities' as essential features of the world over and above 
mundane relative frequencies and places it in the realm of 'theoretical 
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features of  the world, '  the terms referring to it having their meaning fixed 
only by their role in the total  theory,  including the upward and downward 
rules of inference. For,  I have argued, when that  account is looked at closely it 
quickly degenerates into the ' instrumentalist '  account.  
Of course, even in the instrumentalist  account we need still ask ourselves 
what the direct relative frequency to relative frequency rules, compounded 
out of  upward and downward rules fimction joint ly,  are to be and why we 
should adopt these rules and not others. This is still the fundamental  problem 
of  the logic o f  statistical inference. 
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